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DOUBLE JEOPARDY

et al.: Court of Appeals: Davis v. Brown (decided March 28, 1996)

N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6:

No person shall be subject to be tivice put in jeopardy for the
same offense ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V:

No person shall be ... subject for the same offence to be tvice
put in jeopardy of life or limb ....
COURT OF APPEALS
Davis v. Brown1
(decided March 28, 1996)

Petitioner, Arthur Davis, was charged for robbery in the
second degree. 2 The Supreme Court, Queens County, granted a
mistrial3 without prejudice and the petitioner commenced a
proceeding in the nature of a prohibition to bar his retrial under
4
the Federal and State Constitutional Double Jeopardy Clause.
1. 87 N.Y.2d 626, 664 N.E.2d 884, 641 N.Y.S.2d. 819 (1996).
2. Id. at 628, 664 N.E.2d at 885, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
3. The defendant, the State, or the court may make a motion for a
mistrial. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 280.10 (McKinney 1980). Section 280.10
provides in pertinent part:
At any time during the trial, the court must declare a mistrial and order
a new trial of the indictment under the following circumstances:
(1)Upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an
error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the
courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives him of a
fair trial.
Id.
4. Id. The petitioner made an application for a writ of prohibition
pursuant to article 78 of New York's Civil Practice Laws and Rules. N.Y.
Cirv. PRAc. L. & R § 7801. Although CPLR 7801(2) generally cannot be
relied upon to challenge a determination made in a civil action or criminal
matter, prohibition is an exception that "serves to restraiAi judicial or quasijudicial officers from acting without jurisdiction or in excess of their
jurisdiction." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 7801(2) (McKinney 1980) (citing
Practice Commentaries § C7801:4 (citing Town of Huntington v. New York
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The petitioner asserted that he specifically limited his mistrial
motion to one with prejudice and that because he did not consent
to the mistrial without prejudice, his retrial is barred by the
Federal 5 and New York State 6 Constitutional Double Jeopardy
Clauses. 7 The Appellate Division, Second Department, denied
petitioner's application for a writ of prohibition to prevent his
retrial. 8 The New York State Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court and held that the defendant should be permitted to
limit a mistrial motion to one with prejudice, and-if the defendant
is not given the opportunity to withdraw the motion because the
court did not grant the total relief requested, the defendant's
9
retrial should be barred by double jeopardy.
Before the petitioner's trial, the trial court issued two pretrial
rulings precluding the People from eliciting testimony that the
complaining witness had identified petitioner while watching a
"Court T.V." program and from introducing any evidence of
prior warrants issued against petitioner. 10 Despite the rulings, a
State Div. of Human Rights, 82 N.Y.2d 783, 604 N.Y.S.2d 541, 624 N.E.2d
678 (1993))).

"Prosecutors . . . have been brought within the ambit of

prohibition on the theory that they perform a quasi-judicial role when
representing the public in bringing criminal wrongdoers to justice." Id. (citing
Practice Commentaries § C7801:4 (citing Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d
46, 467 N.Y.S.2d 182, 454 N.E.2d 522 (1983))).
Thus, prohibition
proceedings are appropriate when the issue is a criminal prosecution in
potential violation of double jeopardy. Id. (citing Practice Commentaries §
C7801:4 (citing Kraemer v. County Court of Suffolk County, 6 N.Y.2d 363,
189 N.Y.S.2d 878, 168 N.E.2d 633 (1959))).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb ...."d.
6. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Article I, section six, provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense ...." Id.
7. Davis, 87 N.Y.2d at 628, 664 N.E.2d at 885, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). In Benton, the Supreme Court
held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 793-96.
8. Id. at 629, 664 N.E.2d at 886, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
9. Id. at 630-31, 664 N.E.2d at 886, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
10. Id. at 628, 664 N.E.2d at 885, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
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prosecution witness mentioned that he had taped a show on
"channel 51."11 In petitioner's initial motion for a mistrial, he
argued that this testimony was prejudiced because the jury would
know that channel 51 was the local "Court T.V." channel. 12 The
trial court reserved decision on the motion. 13
The following day, the arresting officer testified, in violation of
the pretrial ruling, that a prior warrant was issued against the
petitioner. 14 Davis again moved for a mistrial and asked that it
be granted with prejudice and reminded the judge of the previous
mistrial motion. 15 When the judge asked if petitioner was
"'pressing that motion for a mistrial now,' the petitioner
responded that he was 'pressing it with prejudice.'" 16 Davis
argued further that "'I think there is evidence that the People
intentionally brought in this information before the jury . . .
ignoring the court's order and I am moving for a mistrial with
prejudice.' 17 The judge granted a mistrial but stated that he
would determine later whether to grant it with prejudice. 18 The
petitioner requested that the judge decide immediately if the
mistrial would be granted with prejudice so that Davis could
know whether to withdraw his motion. 19 The judge repeated his
decision to postpone the decision of the terms of the mistrial. 20
The judge requested that both parties submit written legal
memoranda on whether the mistrial should be with or without
prejudice. 2 1 Petitioner's memorandum unequivocally stated that

his motion was only for a mistrial with prejudice, based on
intentional prosecutorial misconduct. 22
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.

19. Id. at 629, 664 N.E.2d at 885, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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When petitioner renewed his mistrial motion with prejudice in
court, the judge granted it without prejudice because "there was
no intent upon the People to provoke the defendant in moving for
a mistrial." 23 Petitioner objected, asserting that the case should
proceed with the impaneled jury. 24 The court adhered to its
ruling and added that the petitioner's initial motion was not
limited, and that his qualification for a mistrial with prejudice
was merely "an addendum -- added yesterday." 25 The jury was
26
discharged and the petitioner was released pending a retrial.
The appellate division denied Davis' application for a writ of
prohibition barring retrial because the court concluded that the
prosecutorial conduct was not intended to provoke the defendant
to move for a mistrial and the petitioner's limited mistrial motion
was not made until after the court had granted the mistrial
27
without prejudice.
The New York State Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal
and reversed the appellate division. 28 The court of appeals began
its analysis by stating that under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of
the Federal and New York State Constitutions, a defendant may
not twice be put in jeopardy of a criminal prosecution for the
same offense. 29 The court stated that under both constitutions,
double jeopardy means that if there is a judicial or prosecutorial
error warranting a mistrial, the defendant has the right to choose
whether to request a new trial or to continue to defend the case
30
before the already impaneled jury.
The court of appeals reiterated certain rules under both federal
and state law that flow from this constitutional protection.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 629, 664 N.E.2d at 885-86, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 820-21.
25. Id. at 629, 664 N.E.2d at 886, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 629-30, 664 N.E.2d at 886, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 821. (citing U.S.
CONST. amend. V; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.).
30. Id. at 630, 664 N.E.2d at 886, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 821 (citing United
States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976); People v. Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d
383, 388 494 N.E.2d 77, 80, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975 (1986)).
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Jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn in. 3 1
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that once
jeopardy attaches, the defendant has a "'valued right to have his
trial completed by a particular tribunal."'32 In the event of
prosecutorial or judicial error, the defendant may make a motion
for a mistrial. 33 Accordingly, where the defendant requests a
mistrial or consents to a mistrial, there is usually no bar to a
retrial. 34
However, if a court finds that the prosecution
intentionally provoked a mistrial motion, even where the
defendant has requested or consented to the mistrial, such retrial
will be barred. 35 Conversely, where the court grants a mistrial
without the consent of the defendant, or over the defendant's
objections, the constitutional double jeopardy protection will
usually bar a retrial. 36 However, retrial will not be barred, even
where the defendant objected to the mistrial, if the court finds
that there was "manifest necessity" or "the ends of public justice
would otherwise be defeated." 37
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed
the issue of a limited mistrial motion, certain federal circuits
relied upon by the New York State Court of Appeals have
concluded that a defendant is allowed to request a mistrial with
prejudice based on prosecutorial misconduct, and is then given
31. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35; People v. Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383,

388, 494 N.E.2d 77, 80, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975 (1986).
32. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 (1976) (quoting Wade v.
Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949); United States v. Jorn. 400 U.S. 470, 48485 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963)).
33. Davis, 87 N.Y.2d at 630, 664 N.E.2d at 886, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
34. Id. (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667. 673 (1982); People v.
Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383, 388 494 N.E.2d 77, 80, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972. 975
(1986)).

35. Id. (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982); People v.
Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383, 388 494 N.E.2d 77, 80, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972. 975

(1986)).
36. Id. (citing People v. Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383, 388, 494 N.E.2d 77.
80, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975 (1986) (citing United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat [22
U.S.] 579, 580 (1824))).
37. Id. (citing Enright v. Siedlecki, 59 N.Y.2d 195, 199, 451 N.E.2d 176,
179, 464 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421 (1983) (citing Unites States v. Perez, 9 Wheat
[22 U.S.] 579, 580 (1824))). Manifest necessity was not at issue in Davis. Id.
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the opportunity to proceed with the initial jury if the mistrial is
not granted with prejudice.
In Weston v. Kernan,38 two
witnesses who were only to testify regarding the identification of
the defendant, offered additional testimony about the defendant's
prior criminal history, thus potentially prejudicing the
defendant. 39 The defendant's initial mistrial motion was not a
limited request, but was followed by a written motion which
made it clear that the defendant only desired a mistrial if jeopardy
would attach. 40 If retrial would not be barred, the defendant
desired that the court provide cautionary instructions to the jury
and allow the trial to continue. 4 1 The judge declared a mistrial
without prejudice, but still made a finding that the testimony was
prejudicial to the defendant. 42 The defendant objected to the
judge's declaration of a mistrial without prejudice, thereby
43
making it clear that he did not consent to the mistrial.
The Weston court acknowledged that the initial mistrial motion
itself could be viewed as unqualified because it lacked an explicit
limitation request, but found that the written motion and the
objections did clarify the defendant's limited request. 44 The
court reasoned that the trial court's grant of a mistrial without
prejudice deprived the defendant of his right to "'retain primary
control' over the course of the proceedings" after judicial or
prosecutorial error. 45 Additionally, the court stated that without
the defendant's "clear acquiescence," the defendant was deprived
of his right to choose whether to continue with the original
jury .46
38. 50 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1995).
39. Id. at 635.

40. Id. at 635-36. The defendant argued that the prosecution had
intentionally goaded the defendant into requesting the mistrial because of the
extraneous testimony offered by the witnesses. Id.
41. Id. at 636.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 637.

45. Id. at 638 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976)).
46. Id. (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456. U.S. 667, 673 (1982)). In
Weston, the third circuit reiterated the Supreme Court's enumerated purposes

for the double jeopardy protection:
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In United States v. Huang,4 7 there was a problem during the
trial with a translator summarizing testimony, rather than
relaying the testimony verbatim. 4 8 Two of the defendants, Park
and Cheoi, on trial for multiple related crimes, objected to the
court's declaration of a mistrial, unless it contained an order
barring retrial. 4 9 Although the defendants requested to proceed
with the first jury, the trial judge declared a mistrial without
prejudice. 50 The New York State Court of Appeals determined
that the trial court did not "scrupulously" explore whether there
was "manifest necessity" to grant the mistrial, thus double
jeopardy barred their retrial. 5 1
The New York double jeopardy jurisprudence is consistent
with the federal double jeopardy jurisprudence. A defendant
makes a motion "with prejudice" when the defendant believes
that the prosecutor's conduct was intentionally designed to
provoke the defendant to move for a mistrial because the
prosecution feared that it's presentation of the case might result
in an acquittal. 52 Such a tactic would, in effect, provide the
prosecution with an "impermissible second bite at the apple...
in direct violation of the letter and spirit of both the State and
53
Federal Double Jeopardy Clauses."

(1) to ensure the finality of judgments in criminal cases; (2) to avoid
compelling a defendant to live in a constant state of anxiety and

insecurity attendant with successive prosecutions for thb same offense;
(3) to avoid giving the prosecution an unfair opportunity to retry the
defendant using information gained from the first trial concerning the
strengths and weaknesses of the State's case; (4) to ensure that the
defendant's right to have his fate decided by the first jury empaneled is
protected; and (5) to avoid the imposition of multiple punishments for

the same offense.
Id. at 636.
47. 960 F.2d 1128 (2nd Cir. 1992).
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1134.
Id.
Id.
Davis, 87 N.Y.2d at 630, 664 N.E.2d at 886, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
Id.
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In reaching its holding that the defendant may delimit his
mistrial motion, the New York State Court of Appeals reasoned
that, if the defendant were disallowed the opportunity to continue
with the first jury because the court found no intentional
prosecutorial misconduct, that would, in effect, penalize the
54
defendant for misperceiving the deliberateness of the conduct.
Henceforth, the defendant's right to have his case decided by the
first jury would be eroded. 55 Moreover, following the Weston
decision, the court stated that "in the absence of the petitioner's
unequivocal acquiescence to a mistrial without prejudice, the
court lacked the petitioner's consent to discharge the first jury,"
56
thereby barring a retrial.
The court relied on People v. Catten57 in addressing the issue
of the defendant initially making an unqualified mistrial motion
and then adding the "with prejudice" limitation the following
day. In Catten, the New York State Court of Appeals held that
the defendant may withdraw a motion for mistrial at anytime
prior to the court granting the motion, and the defendant is free
to continue with the initial jury. 5 8 In Davis, the court reasoned
that the Catten holding "implies the right to modify or limit the
motion before" the mistrial is granted. 59 Again, this is consistent
60
with the defendant's right to be tried by the first jury.
Furthermore, the court determined that any doubts regarding the
motion were resolved by the defendant's written legal
61
memorandum and repeated objections.
In conclusion, federal and New York law are similar with
respect to treatment of the Double Jeopardy protection where a
54. Id. at 631, 664 N.E.2d at 887, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 69 N.Y.2d 547, 508 N.E.2d 920, 516 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1987).
58. Id. at 555, 508 N.E.2d at 925, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 190. This is to be
distinguished from the situation where the defendant desires to withdraw a
mistrial motion after the court grants a mistrial. The decision is then within
the judge's discretion whether to allow the withdrawal. Id.
59. Davis, 87 N.Y.2d at 632, 664 N.E.2d at 887, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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defendant makes a limited motion for a mistrial with prejudice
and desires to proceed with the impaneled jury if the court grants
the mistrial without prejudice. Under both the federal and state
constitutions, the defendant has the right to have his trial before
the first jury, thereby maintaining primary control over the path
upon with to proceed. 62 The Second Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals and New York have held that the
defendant would be deprived of that right if he is not allowed to
make a limited motion based on prosecutorial misconduct.
Additionally, New York law establishes that the right to make a
limited mistrial motion flows naturally from the well settled right
allowing the defendant to withdraw a mistrial motion before the
court grants the motion. 63 Thus, both the federal and New York
state courts are making law to ensure that the double jeopardy
protection is not easily eroded.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Boneta 64
(decided October 21, 1996)
The defendant, William Boneta, was convicted of second and
third degree assault. 65 He appealed to the Appellate Division,
Second Department, claiming that the double jeopardy provisions
of the Federal 66 and New York State Constitutions 67 precluded a
62. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976); People v.
Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383, 388, 494 N.E.2d 77, 80, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975
(1986).
63. Davis, 87 N.Y.2d at 555, 664 N.E.2d at 925, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 190.
64. 649 N.Y.S.2d 443 (2d Dep't 1996).
65. Id. at 443-44.

66. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall... be subject for the same offense to be tvice out in
jeopardy of life and limb ....

" Id.

67. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense . ..
Id.
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